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Appellant Johnson Thermal Systems, Inc. ("JTS") respectfully submits its Appellant's 
Reply Brief. In its Respondent's Brief, Respondent Caldwell Land & Cattle, LLC ("CLC") 
attempts to: (1) broaden the permissible scope of a court's jurisdiction when considering an 
unlawful detainer claim; (2) avoid the plain language of the parties' "Lease" (as that term is 
defined in JTS's opening Appellant's Brief); and (3) gloss over the fact CLC itself required JTS 
to remove the Transformer. For the reasons stated below, CLC's attempts should be rejected by 
the Court. 
II. ARGUMENT 
A. The District Court Improperly Considered Issues Outside CLC's Unlawful Detainer 
Claim. 
1. Idaho law is clear that the only issue to be heard in an action brought by a 
landlord for unlawful detainer is whether the tenant unlawfully detained. 
This Court has consistently held for over 100 years that when a landlord chooses to 
proceed by bringing a statutory claim for unlawful detainer, no other issues outside the unlawful 
detainer claim may be heard by the court. See, e.g., Hunter v. Porter, 10 Idaho 72, 81, 77 P. 434, 
437 (1904) ("To allow the issue of unliquidated damages growing out of an independent 
covenant contained in the lease ... would frustrate the purposes and object of the statute[.]"); 
Richardson v. King, 51 Idaho 762, 10 P.2d 323, 324 (1932) (holding that an unlawful detainer 
action is "limited in its scope and purpose" to "the proceeding itself'); Texaco, Inc. v. Johnson, 
96 Idaho 935, 938, 539 P.2d 288, 291 (1975) (holding that in an unlawful detainer action "[n]o 
other extraneous issues are to be injected by either party to cloud the proceedings for to allow 
either party to interpose questions unrelated to the issue of possession [i.e., unlawful detainer] 
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would frustrate the purpose and objective of the unlawful detainer provisions."); Carter v. 
Zollinger, 146 Idaho 842,845,203 P.3d 1241, 1244 (2009) (holding that "no other issues may be 
injected" into an unlawful detainer action (citing Richardson, 51 Idaho at 766-67, 10 P.2d at 
324-25 (1932) ). Despite CLC's hope otherwise, this Court's holding in Nicholson v. Coeur 
d'Alene Placer Mining Corp., 161 Idaho 877, 392 P.3d 128 (2017), did not change this 100-plus 
year precedent. 
To be clear, JTS is not arguing that CLC cannot seek damages in connection with its 
unlawful detainer claim. Certainly, it can. That, too, is a 100-plus year precedent. See Hunter, 
10 Idaho at 82, 77 P. at 437 (quoting with approval a Washington case wherein it was said that a 
landlord who proves unlawful detainer is entitled to "restitution of the premises ... together with 
damages and rent found due"); Texaco, Inc. v. Johnson, 96 Idaho 935, 940, 539 P.2d 288, 293 
(1975) ("LC. § 6-316 allows a landlord in an unlawful detainer action to recover, in addition to 
possession of his property, damages and rent found due."); see also I.C. § 6-316 ("The jury, or 
the court, if the proceeding be tried without a jury, shall also assess the damages occasioned to 
the plaintiff by any forcible entry, or by any forcible or unlawful detainer .... "). 
What JTS is arguing, is that while the district court was free to assess damages for the 
unlawful detainer claim, it was not free to consider, let alone assess damages for, CLC's breach 
of contract claims (including CLC's claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing)) The reason this is true lies not (as CLC attempts to posit) in the now repealed 
pleading statutes citied in Coe v. Bennet, 39 Idaho 176, 226 P. 736, 736 (1924), nor in the now 
1 As noted by the district court, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is a breach 
of contract. R. 965 n.2 (citing Drug Testing Compliance Grp., LLC v. DOT Compliance Serv., 
161 Idaho 93,103,383 P.3d 1263, 1273 (2016)). 
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rescinded Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 81(a) that governed the practice of "special 
proceedings." See Resp't Br. 13 n.5. Rather, the reason why no other "extraneous issues are to 
be injected by either party" in an unlawful detainer action is found in the unlawful detainer 
statutes themselves. Hunter, 10 Idaho at 81, 77 P. at 437 (holding, after reviewing the unlawful 
detainer statutes, that the statutes themselves makes clear that the purpose of the statutes is to 
provide a summary proceeding and injecting other matters would frustrate the purpose of the 
unlawful detainer statutes); Texaco, 6 Idaho 935, 938, 539 P.2d 288,291 (1975) (same). 
The reasoning behind this rule was explained by this Court in Hunter. In that case, the 
landlord brought an unlawful detainer action against the tenant for failure to pay rent. 10 Idaho at 
77, 77 P. at 435. The tenant counterclaimed and brought various claims for breach of contract, 
alleging that the landlord had violated certain covenants of the parties' lease. Id. Neither party 
objected to the injection of the breach of contract claims in front of the lower court. Id. at 80, 77 
P. at 436. The lower court entered judgment in favor of the landlord on all claims, including the 
tenant's breach of contract claims. Id. However, on appeal, the landlord argued that the Court 
need not consider whether error was committed in granting the landlord judgment on the tenant's 
breach of contract claims because the tenant should not have been allowed to bring the breach of 
contract claims in the first place. Id. 
In considering whether the tenant should be allowed to bring his breach of contract/lease 
claims, the Court looked at the provisions of the unlawful detainer statutes and determined that 
the purpose of the Legislature in enacting the unlawful detainer statutes was to "provide a 
summary method whereby a landlord might collect his rent, or, in default thereof, obtain 
possession of his property." Id. at 81, 77 P. at 437. The Court specifically looked to the section 
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of the unlawful detainer statutes that dealt with the "character of judgment that may be entered" 
and concluded that "every provision of that section looks to the trial of only one issue, namely, 
whether the defendant is either a forcible or unlawful detainer of the premises." Id. The Court 
then held that "To allow the issue of unliquidated damages growing out of an independent 
covenant contained in the lease, and made by the lessor, to be set up either by way of cross-
complaint or counterclaim in such an action, would frustrate the purposes and object of the 
statute[.]" Id. (emphasis added). 
Thus, Hunter stands for the proposition that when a landlord brings a complaint alleging 
unlawful detainer, the sole question to be considered is whether the defendant is an "unlawful 
detainer of the premises." Id. If the defendant is found to be an "unlawful detainer," then, as 
provided for in the section dealing with the "character of judgment that may be entered," the 
court may enter judgment restoring the premises to the landlord, and "assess the damages 
occasioned to the plaintiff ... by any forcible or unlawful detainer ... and find any amount of 
rent due[.]" LC. § 6-316. Notably missing from the judgment provision is any reference to 
entering judgment on breach of the lease claims or granting damages for breach of the lease. Id. 
That is, while the statute allows for the entry of damages caused by the tenant's unlawful 
detainer, it does not allow for the entry of damages caused by a breach of the underlying lease. 
By failing to mention breach of the lease or damages for breach of the lease in the list of items 
that the court may enter judgment on, it was reasonable for the Court in Hunter to conclude that 
claims for breach of contract cannot be injected into a proceeding for unlawful detainer. See 
Local 1494 of Int'! Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 99 Idaho 630, 639, 586 P.2d 
- 4 -
48474.0003.11736042.5 
1346, 1355 (1978) (where a statute specifies certain things, the designation of such things 
excludes all others). 
The reasoning in Hunter was affirmed approximately 25 years later in Richardson v. 
King. There, like in Hunter, the parties injected various claims beyond the unlawful detainer 
claim, and the lower court considered those claims and entered judgment upon them. 51 Idaho 
762, 764-65, 10 P.2d 323, 323-24 (1932). In review of the lower court's actions, the Court 
reiterated the rule that "in an action for unlawful detainer, the sole question is right of possession 
[i.e., did the tenant unlawfully detain the premises] and no other issues may be injected." Id. at 
766, 10 P.2d at 324. Approximately 40 years after Richardson, the Court again reaffirmed the 
reasoning in Hunter in Texaco v. Johnson, when the Court again noted that the purpose of the 
unlawful detainer statutes was to provide a "summary process whereby he [the landlord] could 
regain possession of real property from a tenant or lessee who was unlawfully holding over and 
therefore no longer in rightful possession." 96 Idaho 935, 938, 539 P.2d 288, 291 (1975). And 
then, just as in Hunter (and relying on the purpose of the unlawful detainer statutes and not the 
now repealed statutes in Coe or the rescinded Rule 81(a)) the Court held: 
No other extraneous issues are to be injected by either party to 
cloud the proceeding for to allow either party to interpose 
questions unrelated to the issue of possession [i.e., whether tenant 
unlawfully detained] would frustrate the purpose and objective of 
the unlawful detainer provisions. 
Id. ( emphasis added). 
Finally, approximately 35 years after Texaco, the Court, returning to its statements in 
Richardson, once again re-affirmed the principal first set out in Hunter, stating in Carter v. 
Zollinger that "in an action for unlawful detainer, the sole question involved is right of 
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possession [i.e., did the tenant unlawfully detain the premises], and no other issues may be 
injected." 146 Idaho 842, 845, 203 P.3d 1241, 1244 (2009) (quoting Richardson, 51 Idaho at 
766, 10 P.2d at 324). 
The reason why the Court has maintained this precedent for so long is because the statute 
relied upon by the Court in Hunter to determine that the purpose of the unlawful detainer statutes 
would be frustrated by allowing extraneous matters to enter the proceedings is essentially the 
same today as it was in 1904. The statute referenced in Hunter was § 5106, Chapter 4, Title 3, 
Revised Statutes of 1887, which read, in relevant part: 
If, upon the trial, the verdict of the jury, or, if the case be tried 
without a jury, the finding of the court, be in favor of the plaintiff 
and against the defendant, judgment shall be entered for the 
restitution of the premises; and if the proceeding be for an 
unlawful detainer after neglect or failure to perform the conditions 
or covenants of the lease or agreement under which the property is 
held, or after default in the payment of rent, the judgment shall also 
declare the forfeiture of such lease or agreement. The jury or the 
court, if the proceeding be tried without a jury, shall also assess the 
damages occasioned to the plaintiff by any forcible entry, or by 
any forcible or unlawful detainer, alleged in the complaint, and 
proved on the trial and find the amount of any rent due, if the 
alleged unlawful detainer be after default in the payment of rent, 
and the judgment shall be rendered against the defendant guilty of 
the forcible entry, or forcible or unlawful detainer, for three times 
the amount of the damages thus assessed, and of the rent found 
due. 
REv. STAT.§ 5106 (1887). 
Today, that same statute is codified at Idaho Code Section 6-316 and, with the exception 
of some added language dealing with using the property at issue for the distribution of controlled 




1.C. § 6-316. 
If, upon the trial, the verdict of the jury, or, if the case be tried 
without a jury, the finding of the court, be in favor of the plaintiff 
and against the defendant, judgment shall be entered for the 
restitution of the premises; and if the proceeding be for an 
unlawful detainer after neglect or failure to perform the conditions 
or covenants of the lease or agreement under which the property is 
held, or after default in the payment of rent . . . [ controlled 
substance language] . . . the judgment shall also declare the 
forfeiture of such lease or agreement. The jury, or the court, if the 
proceeding be tried without a jury, shall also assess the damages 
occasioned to the plaintiff by any forcible entry, or by any forcible 
or unlawful detainer, alleged in the complaint and proved on the 
trial, and find the amount of any rent due, if the alleged unlawful 
detainer be after default in the payment of rent or, after default ... 
[ controlled substance language] . . . and the judgment shall be 
rendered against the defendant guilty of the forcible entry, or 
forcible or unlawful detainer, for the amount of the damages thus 
assessed, and of the rent found due. 
Thus, for over a hundred years the law has been clear. When a landlord chooses to avail 
himself of the unlawful detainer statutes, the only question properly before the court is whether 
the defendant unlawfully detained the premises and, if so, what damages were proximately 
caused by the unlawful detention ( as opposed to any breach of the underlying lease) and what 
amount of rent, if any, is due. If it were not so, as this Court stated in Hunter and in Texaco, the 
purpose of the unlawful detainer statutes would be frustrated by clouding the proceedings with 
questions related to unliquidated damages in the form of claims for breach of the lease. See 
Hunter, IO Idaho at 81, 77 P. at 437 ("To allow the issue ofunliquidated damages growing out of 
an independent covenant contained in the lease ... would frustrate the purposes and object of the 
statute[.]"); Texaco, 96 Idaho at 938, 539 P.2d at 291 ("Unlawful detainer statutes were enacted 
for the purpose of providing a landlord or lessor with the benefit of a special summary 
process ... No other extraneous issues are to be injected by either party to cloud the proceedings 
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for to allow either party to interpose questions unrelated to the issue of possession [i.e., unlawful 
detainer] would frustrate the purpose and objective of the unlawful detainer provisions." 
(emphasis added)). 
CLC attempts to escape this clear rule of law by relying on Nicholson v. Coeur d'Alene 
Placer Mining Corp., 161 Idaho 877,392 P.3d 128 (2017). However, Nicholson is factually and 
legally distinguishable from not only the current case but also the Court's prior cases dealing 
with unlawful detainer and, therefore, CLC' s reliance on Nicholson is misplaced. 
First, unlike the present case, Hunter, Richardson, Texaco or Zollinger, Nicholson did not 
involve a plaintiff landlord bringing an action for unlawful detainer. Indeed, Nicholson was 
initiated by the tenant who was claiming breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and unjust 
enrichment against the landlord. 161 Idaho at 880, 392 P.3d at 1221. The landlord then counter-
claimed for unlawful detainer, seeking possession of the property and damages in an amount 
"not less than the monthly rental value of the property." Id. at 886, 392 P.3d at 1227. Notably, 
the landlord was not seeking damages related to an alleged breach of the underlying lease (as 
CLC is attempting to do here). Rather, the landlord was specifically seeking damages related to 
the tenant's unlawful detainer in the form of rent. Id. Moreover, the Court was never asked to 
determine, as a threshold matter, whether the landlord's unlawful detainer counterclaim was 
properly brought or allowed in connection with the tenant's breach of contract and other claims. 
Id. at 886-87, 392 P.3d at 1227-28. Both sides apparently simply assumed it was and did not 
raise that issue on appeal. See id. (lacking any discussion about whether the counterclaim was 
properly raised). Rather, the Court was only asked whether an unlawful detainer claim can 
include a claim for damages based on the value of unpaid rent. Id. That question, the Court 
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answered, as it must, based on pnor precedent and the repeal of certain statutes, in the 
affirmative, and in doing so dispelled any question about whether an unlawful detainer claim 
may support a claim for damages related to the same. Id. 
Specifically, the tenant in Nicholson had relied on Coe v. Bennett, 39 Idaho 176, 226 P. 
736 (1924), for the proposition that an unlawful detainer claim cannot support a claim for 
damages at all. Id. at 886, 392 P.3d at 1228. Reliance on Coe for this argument was misplaced 
for multiple reasons. First, as the Court had already made clear 20 years prior to Coe, an 
unlawful detainer claim allows for the "restitution of the premises ... together with damages and 
rent found due." Hunter, IO Idaho at 82, 77 P. at 437. Second, and the reason upon which the 
Court in Nicholson based its decision, at the time Coe was decided there was a statute that stated 
that causes of action could only be joined if the causes of action belonged to one of six classes of 
cases and there was another statute that stated that one of the grounds for demurrer was that 
different causes of action had been improperly united. Nicholson, 161 Idaho at 886, 392 P.3d at 
1227. The causes of action brought in Coe were from different classes of cases and therefore the 
Coe court held that they were improperly joined. Id.; Coe, 39 Idaho at 181, 226 P. at 737. As 
the Nicholson Court pointed out, both of the statutes relied on by Coe were repealed in 1975. 
Nicholson, 161 Idaho at 887, 392 P.3d at 1228. Thus, the tenant's reliance on Coe for the 
proposition that a claim for unlawful detainer cannot support a claim for damages was clearly 
misplaced. 
However, while the Court clearly rejected the notion that an unlawful detainer claim 
cannot support a claim for damages based on the monthly rental value of the property, it did not 
hold that issues or matters beyond the question of whether the tenant unlawfully detained may be 
- 9 -
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injected when the landlord brings a claim for unlawful detainer. Id. To be clear, Nicholson 
simply reaffirmed the fact that an unlawful detainer claim may include a claim for damages 
related to the unlawful detainer. Id. Contrary to CLC's assertions, Nicholson does not even 
mention, let alone abrogate, the Court's longstanding precedent established in Hunter that issues 
or matters unrelated to the question of unlawful detainer are improper in such a proceeding. Id. 
Indeed, had the Court wanted to abrogate Hunter and its prodigy, it certainly could have, 
especially considering that Coe itself expressly reaffirmed the Court's holding in Hunter. See 
Coe, 39 Idaho at 184, 226 P. at 738 ("This is not in conflict with the doctrine announced in 
Hunter v. Porter[.]"). However, the Court did not take the opportunity to do so. Instead, in one 
short paragraph, the Court simply and directly addressed the question it was asked and held (as it 
always has) that a claim for unlawful detainer may support a claim for damages that stem from 
the unlawful detainer. Nicholson, 161 Idaho at 886-87, 392 P.3d at 1227-28. 
Accordingly, because Nicholson did not even mention, let alone abrogate Hunter, 
Richardson, Texaco, or Carter (or even disavow Coe's reliance on Hunter) those cases are still 
good law. And for good reason. The same rationale that the Court relied on in Hunter is still 
present today. That is, if parties were allowed to inject matters outside of the issue of whether 
the tenant unlawfully detained, it would unnecessarily cloud and delay the proceedings, thereby 
frustrating the purpose of the unlawful detainer statutes.2 See Hunter, IO Idaho at 81, 77 P. at 
437; Texaco, 96 Idaho at 938, 539 P.2d at 291. 
2 Moreover, as noted earlier, the unlawful detainer statutes, and particularly the judgment statute 
relied on in Hunter to support its ruling, has remained essentially unchanged, despite the fact that 
it has been amended various times throughout the years. As such, the Court's interpretation 
remains in force. See Burns Holdings, LLC v. Madison Cnty. Bd of Cnty. Comm 'rs, 14 7 Idaho 
660, 666, 214 P.3d 646, 652 (2009) (noting that the legislature is presumed to have full 
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CLC makes a final attempt to get around this sound reasoning by arguing that because 
CLC's breach of contract claims are related to the landlord-tenant relationship those claims were 
properly considered along with CLC's unlawful detainer claim. This argument was expressly 
rejected by this Court in Hunter. As noted above, in Hunter, the tenant brought breach of 
contract claims based on alleged breaches of the covenants contained in the parties' underlying 
lease. 10 Idaho at 77, 77 P. at 435. The tenant then argued that not only was it his legal right to 
bring such claims in the unlawful detainer action, he was compelled to do so because they related 
to or arose out of the transaction underlying the complaint for unlawful detainer. Id. at 83, 77 P. 
at 438. The Court disagreed, noting that breaches of the underlying lease are not related to an 
unlawful detainer action because "[a] tenant does not become primarily an unlawful detainer 
upon breach of [a] covenant in the lease ... but, rather, upon failure to [vacate] after demand by 
a legal notice in the statutory time." Id. at 84, 77 P. at 438. That is, although a tenant may be a 
holdover tenant and may be in breach of the lease by improperly holding over, "but for service of 
the notice" under the unlawful detainer statutes, the tenant would never become an "unlawful 
detainer." Id. In short, the Court held that breaches of the covenants of the underlying lease are 
not "connected with, a failure to [vacate] after service of notice" under the unlawful detainer 
statutes. Id. Importantly, as the Court points out in Hunter, the landlord is free to forego the 
remedies offered under the unlawful detainer statutes "and maintain his action on the contract[.]" 
Id. However, if the landlord elects to seek his remedies under the unlawful detainer statute, "the 
sole question involved is right of possession, and no other issues may be injected." Carter, 146 
knowledge of the Court's interpretation of statutes and a failure to overturn the Court's 
interpretation while amending the statute at issue functions as a presumption that the 
"Legislature was content with such holdings"). 
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Idaho at 845, 203 P.3d at 1244 (quoting Richardson, 51 Idaho at 766, 10 P.2d at 324 (citing 
Hunter, IO Idaho 72, 77 P. 434) ). 
Because CLC elected to proceed under the unlawful detainer statutes, the district court 
was constrained to only consider whether JTS had unlawfully detained the premises and, if so, 
what damages and rent, if any, were proximately caused by the unlawful detainer. Texaco, 96 
Idaho at 940, 539 P.2d at 293 (noting that a landlord may seek damages that are "the proximate 
or direct result of the unlawful detention." ( emphasis added)). I.C. § 6-316 (allowing entry of 
judgment for "damages occasioned to the plaintiff by any forcible entry, or by any forcible or 
unlawful detainer. .. "). The district court was not allowed to extend judgment to include the 
parties' breach of contract claims and award CLC damages caused by JTS' s alleged breach of 
the underlying lease (as opposed to damages related to the unlawful detainer). Carter, 146 Idaho 
at 845, 203 P.3d at 1244 (quoting Richardson, 51 Idaho at 766, 10 P.2d at 324 ("Being thus 
limited in its scope and purpose, a judgment rendered in such an action (unlawful detainer) can 
have no broader application than the proceeding itself, and, the latter being confined to the one 
issue of possession, judgments rendered therein cannot be extended to include other matters."). 
Doing so frustrated the purpose of the unlawful detainer statutes. See Hunter, IO Idaho at 81, 77 
P. at 437 ("To allow the issue of unliquidated damages growing out of an independent covenant 
contained in the lease ... would frustrate the purposes and object of the statute[.]"); Texaco, 96 
Idaho at 938, 539 P.2d at 291 ("Unlawful detainer statutes were enacted for the purpose of 
providing a landlord or lessor with the benefit of a special summary process . . . . No other 
extraneous issues are to be injected by either party to cloud the proceedings for to allow either 
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party to interpose questions unrelated to the issue of possession [i.e., unlawful detainer] would 
frustrate the purpose and objective of the unlawful detainer provisions." (emphasis added)). 
Ultimately, CLC chose to seek its remedies under the unlawful detainer statutes. Indeed, 
CLC's original complaint only sought relief under the unlawful detainer statutes. R. 23-31 
(alleging one count of unlawful detainer). And, even though CLC amended its complaint after 
JTS had vacated the property (and therefore possession was clearly no longer an issue), see R. 50 
(noting filing date of March 24, 2015, over a month after JTS had vacated on February 12, 
2015), CLC, in an effort to take advantage of the streamlined remedies afforded under the 
unlawful detainer statutes, as well as seek damages under the Lease, chose to keep its unlawful 
detainer claim in place rather than to proceed only under the Lease. R. 50-70 (restating its 
unlawful detainer claim but adding breach of contract and malicious injury claims as well). As 
the Court recognized in Hunter, CLC could have chosen to "forgo" seeking remedy under the 
unlawful detainer statutes and maintained its "action on the contract." 10 Idaho at 84, 77 P. at 
438. However, having chosen to proceed under the unlawful detainer statutes, CLC elected its 
remedy. As such, the only issue authorized to be heard was whether JTS unlawfully detained the 
Property, and the district court erred in allowing the parties to inject issues and matters outside of 
the issue of the unlawful detainer claim and in awarding CLC damages for its breach of contract 
claims. Therefore, consistent with the holdings in Hunter, Richardson, and their progeny, JTS 
respectfully requests that even if JTS unlawfully detained (it did not), the Court strike all 
findings, conclusions, and damages, related to CLC's breach of contract claims (as opposed to 
those related to its unlawful detainer claims). 3 
3 CLC briefly attempts to argue that because it did not conduct a "quick evict" under Idaho Code 
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2. Because the district court improperly considered and awarded damages on 
CLC's breach of contract claims, all damages related to CLC's breach of 
contract claims should be struck. 
CLC attempts to save its improperly considered breach of contract claims and their 
resultant damages by arguing that because the district court awarded damages for CLC' s 
unlawful detainer claims and contract claims any impropriety was cured as the damages for 
contract claims and unlawful detainer clams are the same. To be sure, the district court stated: 
Based on Defendant's unlawful detainer and breach of contract ... 
Plaintiff may recover the following damages from Defendant: rent 
due under the Lease Agreement through April 15, 2015 
($7,603.12) (Ex. 22); damages and costs caused by Defendant's 
removal of the transformer ($7,929) (Exs. 22 and 26); Peterbilt's 
rent and triple-net for its old lease ($14,587.92) (Exs. 22-24); cost 
of Peterbilt's idle employee ($7,696.22) (Exs. 22 and 25); costs to 
repair the Property ($2,600.00) (Exs. 22, 27, and 28); and 
Peterbilt's lost profits ($45,973.00) (Exs. 22 and 29). 
R. 624 ( emphasis added). 
However, to the extent that any damages awarded were based on CLC' s breach of 
contract claims, as opposed to CLC's unlawful detainer claim, those damages stemming from the 
breach of contract claims must be struck. See Richardson, 51 Idaho at 766-67, 10 P.2d at 325-26 
(striking parts of district court's order that related to matters outside the unlawful detainer 
action); Carter v. Zollinger, 146 Idaho 842, 845, 203 P.3d 1241, 1244 (2009) ("Being thus 
limited in its scope and purpose, a judgment rendered in such an action (unlawful detainer) can 
§ 6-310, it should be allowed to combine its breach of contract claims with its unlawful detainer 
claim. Resp't Br. 18-19. However, section 6-310 does not broaden the issues that may be 
considered in an unlawful detainer proceeding-it limits them. See I.C. § 6-31 lE ("[S]ection 6-
310, Idaho Code, shall not be applicable when an action for damages is combined with an action 
for possession"). Moreover, Hunter and Texaco both discussed the availability of damages for 
unlawful detainer-as such it is clear that they were not dealing with the "quick evict" provision 
under section 6-310. Indeed, Hunter explicitly relied on what is now section 6-316, not 6-310. 
- 14 -
48474.0003.11736042.5 
have no broader application than the proceeding itself, and, the latter being confined solely to the 
one issue of possession, judgments rendered therein cannot be extended to include other 
matters." (quoting Richardson, 51 Idaho at 766, 10 P.2d at 325)). This would include all 
damages related to JTS's alleged "failure to vacate the Property after its term expired; remov[al] 
of the transformer after the term expired and without Plaintiff's permission; and fail[ure] to make 
repairs." R. 964. As the district court explicitly found that those offenses were breaches of the 
parties' lease or contract-not JTS's alleged unlawful detainer. R. 964 ("Defendant is liable for 
breach of contract because it .... " (emphasis added)). This conclusion is further buttressed by 
the fact that the district court cited to provisions of the Lease for support in finding JTS liable for 
the above-mentioned alleged breaches. R. 964 ( citing the "Surrender of Premises"; "Time of 
Essence"; "Maintenance and Repair"; and "Improvements" provisions). The same is true of any 
damages related to JTS' s alleged breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, 
which include damages related to any failure "to timely give notice of when it [JTS] would 
vacate the Property, and fail[ure] to pay the higher rent amount for the month-to-month option." 
R. 964. 
Rather, the only damages that the district court found proximately caused by JTS's 
alleged unlawful detainer are those related to JTS' s alleged failure "to vacate the property within 
the timeframe set forth in the notice to vacate." R. 963 ("Defendant is liable for unlawful 
detainer because it failed to vacate the property within the timeframe set forth in the notice to 
vacate." (emphasis added)). It is undisputed that JTS vacated the property by February 12, 2015. 
Tr. Vol. III, p. 516, LL. 16-24; R. 145 ,r 40 (admitting as much). Thus, the only damages that 
were a direct result of JTS's alleged unlawful detainer, as opposed to JTS's alleged breaches of 
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contract or breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, are for the rent during which 
JTS allegedly unlawfully detained. See LC.§ 6-316 (allowing damages "occasioned ... by ... 
unlawful detainer"); Texaco, 96 Idaho at 940, 539 P.2d at 293 (noting that damages claimed 
under Idaho Code Section 6-316 must be from "the proximate or direct result of the unlawful 
detention" (emphasis added)); cf Nicholson, 161 Idaho at 886, 392 P.3d at 1227 (affirming 
damages for unlawful detainer in an amount equal to the daily rent from the time set forth in the 
notice "until [tenants] vacate the Property."). 
While it is true that the damages for unlawful detainer may be for more than just rent, LC. 
§ 6-316 (allowing in addition to rent damages occasioned by the unlawful detainer); Texaco, 
Inc. v. Johnson, 96 Idaho 935, 940, 539 P.2d 288, 293 (1975) (noting that damages that are the 
"proximate or direct result of the unlawful detention" are recoverable), there is no question that, 
as explained above, all other damages in this case (except rent for the 12-day holdover) were 
found by the district court to be a proximate or direct result of the alleged breaches of contract, 
not the alleged unlawful detention of the Property. R. 963 ("Defendant is liable for unlawful 
detainer because it failed to vacate the property .... "); R. 964 ("Defendant is liable for breach of 
contract because it ... removed the transformer after the term had expired without permission; 
and failed to make repairs."). 
As such, because all damages (except rent for the 12 days of unlawful detainer, which 
was paid by JTS (R. 145,142 (admitting that CLC retained JTS's February rent))) were related 
to JTS 's alleged breach of the Lease and the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and not the 
alleged unlawful detainer, the district court exceeded its subject-matter jurisdiction in awarding 
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said damages and, consistent with the holding in Richardson supra, the Court should strike all 
other damages. 
B. As a Matter of Law, JTS Properly Exercised the Six-Month Renewal Under the 
Third Amendment. 
JTS agrees with CLC that the language of the Third Amendment is clear and 
unambiguous. See Resp't Br. 22. Despite this agreement, CLC spends much of its brief arguing 
about the parties' intent in creating the Third Amendment and presenting extrinsic evidence that 
the district court allegedly relied on in interpreting the Lease and Third Amendment. See Resp't 
Br. 25-30. However, "So long as the language of the contract is unambiguous, extrinsic 
evidence is not admissible to prove the intent of the parties." Commercial Ventures, Inc. v. Rex 
M & Lynn Lea Family Tr., 145 Idaho 208, 214, 177 P.3d 955, 961 (2008) (quoting Johnson 
Cattle Co. v. Idaho First Nat'! Bank, 110 Idaho 604, 607, 716 P.2d 1376, 1379 (Ct. App. 1986)). 
Further, "[u]nder the parol evidence rule, if the written agreement is complete on its face and 
unambiguous ... extrinsic evidence of prior contemporaneous negotiations or conversations is 
not admissible to contradict, vary, alter, add to or detract from the terms of the written contract." 
Wolford v. Montee, 161 Idaho 432, 437-38, 387 P.3d 100, 105-06 (2016) (quoting Lindberg v. 
Roseth, 137 Idaho 222, 228, 46 P.3d 518, 524 (2002)). As such, because the Lease and Third 
Amendment are undisputedly unambiguous, the Court should disregard all of CLC's arguments 
regarding the intent of the parties and the district court's reliance on any extrinsic evidence in 
interpreting the same. 
Rather, because the parties agree that the Third Amendment is unambiguous (and 
because the district court found as much, R. 961 ("The plain language of the Lease 
Agreement ... ")), the sole issue is whether JTS complied with the plain language of the Third 
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Amendment when it exercised its option to extend the Lease. That question is one of law over 
which the Court exercises free review. Weisel v. Beaver Springs Owners Ass'n, Inc., 152 Idaho 
519, 526, 272 P.3d 491, 498 (2012) ("If the language of the [contract] is unambiguous, its 
interpretation is a matter of law over which this Court exercises free review."). 
In its Respondent's Brief, CLC attempts to argue that even though the Third Amendment 
clearly amended the Lease and added a third option or way the Lease could be extended, JTS 
was still required to exercise the option to renew for six months in writing. See Resp't Br. 23-16. 
The entirety of CLC's argument in this regard relies on the inclusion of paragraph four in the 
Third Amendment. Id. at 22-23. That paragraph reads: "All other terms and conditions of the 
Lease Agreement, not specifically amended hereby, remain in full force and effect." R. 121, ,i 4. 
CLC attempts to use this paragraph to bootstrap a writing requirement into the plain language of 
the Third Amendment by pointing to the Option to Renew provision in the Lease. See id. 
However, CLC's argument fails because, although paragraph four in the Third Amendment 
makes clear that the Option to Renew provision "remain[s] in full force and effect," that 
provision does not affect the plain language of the Third Amendment. 
First, CLC only quotes part of the Option to Renew provision of the Lease. See Resp't 
Br. 23. In full, the provision reads: 
OPTION TO RENEW: Upon Lessor's receipt of written notice by 
the Lessee at least sixty ( 60) days prior to the expiration of this 
Lease Agreement, Lessor grants to Lessee an option to renew this 
Lease for an additional two (2) terms of one (1) year each 
commencing with the expiration for this Lease Agreement. Rent 
shall increase on a basis of three percent (3%) with the 
commencement of each new term. All other terms of the renewed 
Lease shall be negotiable. 
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R. 110. Notably, when read in full, it is clear that the Option to Renew provision grants a 
specific option to renew (hereinafter, "Option to Renew"). By its plain language, the Option to 
Renew only allows for renewal: (1) with written notice; and (2) for a one-year term at a three 
percent increase. This is a unique and confined option to renew with specific requirements and 
terms. There is no language in this provision indicating that any or all options to extend the 
Lease must be on the same terms or subject to the same written notice requirement as the Option 
to Renew. Rather, the requirement that the Lessee provide written notice is expressly limited to 
the provisions of the Option to Renew. Indeed, the written notice requirement is in the same 
sentence as the grant of the Option to Renew. Thus, if JTS wanted to exercise the Option to 
Renew and extend its term for one year at a three percent increase it would be required to 
provide written notice. R. 110. 
Critically, however, the option to extend in the Third Amendment is not the same as the 
Option to Renew, rather, the Third Amendment provides: 
At the conclusion of this lease extension the Tenant shall have the 
option to extend the lease agreement for an additional period of 
either six (6) months or on a month to month basis at the following 
rates: 
a. Six Month Term: Base Rent= $6,000.00/mo 
b. Month to Month Term: Base Rent= $6,250.00/mo 
The Base Rent plus NNN expenses shall be paid monthly, m 
advance, in accordance with the terms of the Lease. 
R. 121, ,r 3 (hereinafter "Option to Extend"). JTS is not claiming that it exercised the Option to 
Renew. Nor could it. The Option to Renew only allows for a one-year term at a three percent 
increase. JTS extended the Lease using the Option to Extend under the Third Amendment for a 
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six-month extension at roughly a ten percent increase. See R. 121 (providing that the rent 
increased to $6,000 per month).4 Thus, while the Third Amendment did not alter the Option to 
Renew and the Option to Renew remained "in full force and effect," it simply has no bearing on 
whether JTS complied with the clear and express terms of the Option to Extend found in the 
Third Amendment because the terms and requirements of the Option to Renew provision only 
apply to the Option to Renew, they cannot be carried over into the Option to Extend in the Third 
Amendment. 
That this is legally correct is explicitly demonstrated in Dante v. Golas, 121 Idaho 149, 
823 P.2d 183 (Ct. App. 1992). There, the parties' contract provided two separate methods by 
which an option could be exercised. Id. at 150, 823 P .2d at 184. One party attempted to argue 
that the notice requirements of the first option also applied to the second option. Id. The Court of 
Appeals explicitly rejected this argument. Id. The argument was rejected even though the 
second option to renew was actually a subparagraph of the first option. See id. ( quoting the 
applicable provisions with the second option being numbered (1) under the first option). 
Here, CLC is attempting to make the same argument that was rejected in Dante. That is, 
CLC is attempting to argue that the notice requirements in the Option to Renew, somehow apply 
to the separate and distinct Option to Extend found in the Third Amendment. As in Dante, such 
an argument should be rejected. This is particularly true because, unlike in Dante, the separate 
Option to Extend is not even in the same section as the Option to Renew-let alone a 
subparagraph of the Option to Renew. To hold otherwise would be to impermissibly rewrite the 
4 Prior to that point, the rent was $5,428.97. See R. 109 (providing that original rent was 
$5,270.84, which after exercising the first Option to Renew would have increased by 3% to 
$5,428.97, which is what it was when the parties executed the Third Amendment and increased 
the rent by $571.03 (approximately 10% of then current rent of $5,428.97) to $6,000). 
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Third Amendment. See, e.g., Shawver v. Huckleberry Estates, L.L.C., 140 Idaho 354, 362, 93 
P.3d 685, 693 (2004) ("Courts do not possess the roving power to rewrite contracts[.]"). 
Thus, while it is true that the Option to Renew provision in the Lease remained in "full 
force and effect," that fact has no bearing whatsoever on the terms and requirements agreed to 
for the Option to Extend as set out in the Third Amendment. The plain language of the Third 
Amendment does not require a written notice or agreement and the Option to Renew provision 
does not contain any language indicating that its requirements extend beyond its own boundaries. 
Ultimately, JTS does not dispute the fact that the Option to Renew provision remained in 
"full force and effect" after the Third Amendment was executed. That provision simply does not 
affect or alter the plain language of the Third Amendment. Thus, if JTS wanted to use the 
Option to Renew, it could have done so by providing written notice and renewing its term for 
one year at a three percent rent increase. See R. 110. However, JTS chose to exercise the Option 
to Extend in the Third Amendment, which did not require written notice and extended its term 
for six months at a ten percent rent increase. See R. 121. Instead, the plain language of the Third 
Amendment clearly provided that: (1) "At the conclusion of this lease extension"; (2) "the 
Tenant shall have the option to extend the lease agreement ... at the following rate [ ] Six Month 
Term: Base Rent= $6,000.00/mo"; and (3) "[t]he Base Rent plus NNN expenses shall be paid 
monthly[.]" R. 121, ,r 3. There is no mention anywhere in the plain language of the Third 
Amendment regarding a written notice or agreement requirement. 
This is because no written notice or agreement was needed as the terms for the six-month 
extension were clearly laid out: i.e., if, "at the conclusion of the Lease extension" JTS paid 
$6,000 plus triple-net, then the term of the Lease would be extended by six months. If JTS paid 
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$6,250 plus triple-net, then the Lease would convert to a month-to-month term. Accordingly, as 
a matter of law, once JTS complied with the plain language of the Third Amendment, i.e., once 
JTS: (1) at the conclusion of the lease extension; (2) paid a base rent of $6,000.00; and (3) paid 
the base rent plus NNN expenses monthly, the term of the Lease was extended for six months. 
The plain language of the Third Amendment does not require more. Thus, Gilbert, and 
subsequently CLC, was bound to the six-month extension. See Cristo Viene Pentecostal Church 
v. Paz, 144 Idaho 304, 309, 160 P.3d 743, 748 (2007) (noting that the obligation of the optionor 
is triggered when the optionee exercises "the option in the manner prescribed in the parties' 
contract"); Dennett v. Kuenzli, 130 Idaho 21, 28-29, 936 P.2d 219, 226-27 (Ct. App. 1997) 
(holding that an option was complete upon the fulfillment of the plain requirements of the 
contract); Dante v. Golas, 121 Idaho 149, 150-51, 823 P.2d 183, 184-85 (Ct. App. 1992) 
(holding that an option was exercised when the optionees complied with the plain language of 
the contract). 
Therefore, the district court erred in disregarding the plain language of the Third 
Amendment by reading a "written requirement" into the Third Amendment where none was 
present, and further erred by considering extrinsic evidence in arriving at that conclusion. JTS, 
having complied with the plain language of the Third Amendment, successfully exercised its 
option to extend the Lease another six months and was entitled to remain on the Property until 
April 15, 2015. As such, JTS was not liable for unlawful detainer (or breach of contract or 
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing) and the district court's rulings to 
the contrary should be overturned as well. 
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C. The District Court's Additional Findings that JTS Breached the Lease and the 
Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Are Not Supported by the Evidence. 
Even if the district court did not err in considering CLC's breach of contract claims, 
including the breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing claims, in the same 
proceeding as CLC's claim for unlawful detainer (it did); and even if the district court did not err 
in reading a writing requirement into the Third Amendment (it did); the district court's findings 
that JTS breached the Lease by "removing the transformer after the term expired and without 
Plaintiffs permission" and breached the covenant of good faith and fajr dealing by failing to 
"give timely notice of when it would vacate the Property, and failed to pay the higher rent 
amount for the month-to-month option," R. 623, were unsupported by the evidence and therefore 
should be reversed. 
1. JTS did not breach the Lease by removing the transformer. 
Initially, JTS notes that CLC does not dispute the fact that the transformer was a trade 
fixture rather than a permanent improvement. See Resp't Br. 36-41. Further, CLC does not 
dispute the fact that the Surrender of Premises provision of the Lease expressly authorized JTS to 
remove its trade fixtures from the Property. Id Nor does CLC dispute the fact that the 
December 11, 2014, eviction letter ("Eviction Letter") sent at CLC's insistence (indeed, 
CLC/Peterbilt threatened to sue if the letter was not sent, Tr. Vol. II, p. 268 L. 2 - p. 270 L. 25), 
also expressly required JTS to remove its trade fixtures. Id R. 87 (requiring JTS to remove all 
of its "trade fixtures, fencing, and personal property of any kind, and surrender [ the Property] in 
the same condition, reasonable wear and tear excepted, as [ the Property] were in at the beginning 
of the Lease."). Rather, CLC attempts to circumvent the plain language of the Surrender of 
Premises provision and the Eviction Letter (that it insisted was sent), by arguing that JTS 
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violated the Improvements provision of the Lease by removing the temporary 480V power 
without CLC's permission. Id. at 39. CLC also makes a brief argument that JTS was also liable 
for damages related to the removal of the transformer under the Lease's Liability Insurance and 
Indemnification of Lessor provisions of the Lease. See Resp't Br. 38-39, 41. None of these 
provisions, however, provide a basis for sustaining the district court's findings that JTS breached 
the Lease by removing the transformer. Indeed, finding that JTS breached the Lease by 
removing the transformer was inconsistent with the Surrender of Premises provision of the Lease 
and the plain language of the Eviction Letter, which CLC demanded be sent. 
a) JTS had permission to remove the transformer. 
To begin, CLC's reliance on the Improvements provision is misplaced. By its plain 
language, as the heading suggests, that provision applies to improvements made by the tenant to 
the leased premises. R. 111 ("The Lessee shall not reconstruct, remodel, or change .... "). It does 
not say anything about the removal of trade fixtures previously installed by the tenant. Thus, by its 
plain language, the Improvements provision does not apply to the removal of the transformer. 
Next even if the Improvements provision could be read to include the removal of transformer, CLC 
does not dispute the fact that the transformer was a trade fixture. In fact, CLC does not even 
dispute the fact that JTS was entitled to remove the transformer. Id. at 36-41. Instead, CLC claims 
that the district court found that JTS breached the Lease not because JTS removed its trade fixture, 
i.e., the transformer, but because "JTS failed to get permission" to do so. Id. at 39. This argument 
overlooks the district court's finding. The district court expressly found that JTS was liable for 
breach of contract as a result of JTS removing the transformer and doing so without CLC's 
permission. R. 623 ("[JTS] is liable for breach of contract because it ... removed the transformer 
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after the terms expired and without [CLC's] permission[.]" (emphasis added)). By failing to 
dispute the fact that the transformer was a trade fixture JTS was entitled to remove, CLC 
apparently concedes that the first part of the district court's finding related to the removal of the 
transformer was incorrect, and therefore JTS did not breach the Lease by removing the 
transformer. Rather, CLC maintains that JTS breached the Lease only in relation to the second part 
of the district court's finding, i.e., JTS breached the Lease not by removing the transformer, but by 
doing so without permission. Resp't Br. 39. 
However, the Eviction Letter, which CLC threatened to sue Gilbert for if she did not send, 
clearly stated that JTS was required to remove its: "trade fixtures, fencing, and personal property of 
any kind, and surrender [the Property] in the same condition, reasonable wear and tear excepted, as 
[the Property] were in at the beginning of the Lease." R. 87. Moreover, the Lease itself expressly 
provided that JTS was to surrender the premises in the "same condition, reasonable wear and tear 
expected [sic], that the premises was in at the beginning of this Agreement" and that JTS was 
"entitled to remove its trade fixtures " R. 113, Surrender of Premises. This language in the 
Eviction Letter and the Lease clearly authorized, and indeed required, JTS to remove its trade 
fixtures. CLC does not dispute that the transformer was a trade fixture rather than a permanent 
improvement. Further, the Eviction Letter and Lease demanded that JTS return the Property to the 
"same condition" it was "in at the beginning of the Lease." R. 87, R. 113. 
It is undisputed that the Property did not have 480V power at the beginning of the Lease. 
See Tr. Vol. II, p. 299, LL. 12-16 (Idaho Power testifying that JTS arraigned to have the 480V 
transformer added to the Property in February 2014); Tr. Vol. I, p. 108, LL. 9-13. Thus, the 
Eviction Letter and the Lease, by requiring the Property to be returned to the same condition it was 
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in at the beginning of the Lease, expressly authorized and even required JTS to remove the 
temporary 480V power. That CLC was unaware that returning the Property to the same condition 
it was in at the beginning of the Lease included the removal of the temporary 480V transformer, 
does not change the fact that Gilbert, and consequently CLC as successor in interest, expressly 
consented and indeed demanded that JTS return the property to the same condition it was in at the 
beginning of the Lease. 
Furthermore, CLC' s attempt to place the burden of notifying CLC of the temporary nature 
of the 480V power on JTS is contrary to Idaho's clear "buyer beware" law. See, e.g., Barab v. 
Plumleigh, 123 Idaho 890, 894, 853 P.2d 635, 639 (Ct. App. 1993) (noting the rule of caveat 
emptor and that "[t]he general rule is that the vendor of real property who parts with title, 
possession, and control of the property is permitted to shift all responsibility for the condition of 
the land to the purchaser."). If 480V power was a crucial condition of the Property, CLC, as part 
of its due diligence as the purchaser of the Property, should have verified that the 480V power was 
included in the sale of the Property. It did not. Tr. Vol. I, p. 187, L. 25 - p. 189, L. 8 (noting that 
CLC did not verify the status of the 480V power). 
Accordingly, given the plain language of the Eviction Letter and the Surrender of Premises 
provision of the Lease, JTS not only had permission but was required to remove the temporary 
480V transformer. Thus, CLC's arguments that JTS did not have permission or CLC's consent to 
remove the transformer fail. The Lease and the Eviction Letter, which CLC insisted be sent, 
provided JTS with all the permission it needed. Moreover, despite CLC' s insistence otherwise, 
even if CLC had done its due diligence regarding the transformer and contacted Idaho Power about 
leaving the transformer on the property, Idaho Power testified that while theoretically possible, it 
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was "out of our realm of how we [Idaho Power] do business," and that "[i]t's temporary so it's 
coming back out? I Yeah." Tr. Vol. II, p. 302, LL. 10-22. Thus, it is clear that the transformer was 
always going to be removed when JTS left the Property. 
Therefore, because JTS was authorized by the Lease and Eviction Letter to remove its trade 
fixtures, i.e., the transformer, JTS did not violate the Improvements provision of the Lease by 
removing the transformer. Consequently, even if a written requirement is somehow blue-penciled 
into the Third Amendment and JTS is found liable for breach of contract, CLC should not be 
allowed to recover any damages related to the removal of the temporary 480V power, and thus any 
breach of contract damages should be limited to those directly related to JTS' s alleged failure to 
timely vacate as described in JTS's Appellant's Brief. See Appellant's Br. 29-34. 
b) The Liability Insurance and Indemnification of Lessor provisions of 
the Lease do not support the district court's finding of liability for 
damages. 
CLC briefly argues that the Liability Insurance and Indemnification of Lessor provisions of 
the Lease provide a basis to award CLC damages related to the removal of the transformer. They 
do not. 
The Indemnification provision, by its own express terms, only applies to "claims for 
damages and injuries ... during the term of the Lease." R. 113 "Indemnification of Lessor." 
The court ruled that the Lease expired on October 15, 2014, and that JTS carried on as a month-to-
month or at-will tenant after that date. R. 961. In December 2014, Gilbert sent JTS the Eviction 
Letter, thereby terminating the month-to-month or at-will tenancy as of January 31, 2015. Id at 3. 
Thus, even if JTS failed to properly execute the option to renew under the Third Amendment, and 
even if the terms of the Lease carried over into the new month-to-month or at-will tenancy, the 
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Lease terminated no later than January 31, 2015. It is undisputed that CLC's damages, if any, all 
occurred after January 31, 2015. Therefore, CLC' s damages did not arise or occur "during the term 
of the Lease." Consequently, the Indemnification provision cannot be a basis for awarding CLC 
any alleged damages. 
Similarly, the Liability Insurance provision, by its express terms, only applies to damages 
"arising from the use and occupancy of the [Property] by Lessee[.]" R. 110 "Liability Insurance" 
( emphasis added). Thus, to apply, JTS must have still been in occupancy of the Property at the 
time of the alleged damage. It is undisputed that JTS vacated the Property on February 12, 2015. 
See R. 145, ,r 40 (admitting that JTS vacated the Property on February 12, 2015). Accordingly, 
any damages that arose after that date are not covered by the Liability Insurance provision and, · 
therefore, the Liability Insurance provision cannot be a basis for awarding any alleged damages 
beyond that date. 
2. JTS did not breach the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
Rather than attempt to explain how JTS could be liable for breaching the covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing by: (1) not paying rent under the Lease when the district court 
expressly found that JTS had failed to renew the Lease, see Appellant's Br. 27-28; or (2) by 
failing to give notice to vacate when the district court had already found that JTS was obligated 
to vacate by January 31, 2015, and did in fact provide notice of its intent to move out, see 
Appellant's Br. 28-29, CLC attempts to cast JTS as a bad actor who was trying to somehow play 
"both sides." Resp't Br. 35. 
In doing so, CLC claims that JTS obfuscated or somehow equivocated about its intent to 
exercise the six-month extension or remain in the Property until April 2015 and that when the 
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"Property was listed and sold in November, JTS did not represented [sic] to CLC that it would 
remain through April 2015." Resp't Br. 33 n.23. CLC further claims that because after JTS was 
threatened with eviction JTS represented that it could feasibly be out of the Property earlier than 
April 2015, that, too, somehow shows bad faith. Id 34. CLC then incredibly claims that "[b]y 
failing to vacate the Property and pay rent through April 2015, JTS damaged CLC." Id 
( emphasis added). That is, CLC claims that JTS should have vacated the Property by 
January 31, 2015, and then continue to pay rent through April 2015. Id; see also Tr. Vol. III, 
p. 528, L. 11 - p. 529, L. 14 (CLC's president acknowledging an email CLC sent to JTS after 
JTS had vacated the Property in February that stated "March rent is due on the 181."). 
However, despite CLC's insinuations to the contrary, JTS consistently and openly 
maintained that it had exercised the Option to Extend the term of the Lease by six months and 
intended to remain until April 2015. JTS was never specifically asked prior to December 2014, 
whether it had exercised the six-month Option to Extend. Tr. Vol. II, p. 255, LL. 9-25. Upon 
receiving notification that CLC planned on occupying the Property as soon as possible, JTS 
immediately responded that it had exercised the Option to Extend the Lease for an additional six 
months. Tr. Vol. I, p. 124, LL. 15-25. JTS never waivered from that position. Tr. Vol. I, p. 124, 
LL. 5-8. And consistent with that position, JTS paid the monthly amount associated with the six-
month extension beginning November 1, 2014. R. 242, ,r 2. Indeed, that JTS consistently 
maintained that it had exercised the Option to Extend for six months was even recognized by 
CLC's president. Tr. Vol. III, p. 529, LL. 2-4 ("That was your position. That's been Johnson 
Thermal's position from day one."). Further, although it is true that after JTS was served with 
the eviction notice it represented that, in an effort to compromise and avoid legal action, it could 
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possibly be out of the Property before April 15, 2015, such efforts can hardly be considered bad 
faith. R. 515 (subpages 25-26). 
Rather, prior to CLC's insistence that JTS move out by CLC's closing date with Gilbert, 
there was no disagreement between JTS and Gilbert regarding the Lease. Indeed, Gilbert stated 
on multiple occasions that she wanted to be fair to JTS. Tr. Vol. I, p. 123, LL. 6-8; Tr. Vol. II, 
p. 259, LL. 4-17, p. 260, LL. 12-17. CLC now claims that it did not know that JTS was a tenant 
in the building when it entered the purchase agreement, but it is clear that is not the case. Tr. 
Vol. III, p. 373, LL. 7-13 (CLC's president stating that at the time CLC entered the purchase 
agreement with Gilbert CLC knew that JTS occupied the property as a tenant). Further, even if 
CLC did not know that JTS was a tenant, it is undisputed that during the due diligence period, if 
CLC was dissatisfied with Gilbert and JTS's lease agreement, it could have simply walked away. 
Tr. Vol. II, p. 252, L. 16 - p. 254, L. 17 (Collier agent testifying that CLC had the opportunity to 
look over the tenancy arrangements between Gilbert and JTS during the due diligence period and 
could have walked away without losing any money if it was dissatisfied). Instead, CLC insisted 
on Gilbert evicting JTS. Tr. Vol. III, p. 464, LL. 3-9 ("I don't want to be unkind- but we don't 
care about their [JTS and Gilbert's) agreement. We close on Dec 31. We are taking 
possession of the building.").5 
Thus, CLC's insinuations that JTS was playing games or somehow deceitful in its 
representations regarding its intention to exercise the six-month Lease are not supported in the 
5 CLC also attempts to assign ill motive to JTS sending payments directly to Gilbert instead to 
Gilbert's real estate agent, Colliers, was somehow misleading or disingenuous. Resp't Br. 10. 
However, JTS had always sent its payments directly to Gilbert. Tr. Vol. I, p. 41, LL. 14-15 
(noting that Gilbert came into the office at JTS the same day she received the check JTS had 
sent). There is nothing in the record to suggest that this practice was incorrect. Colliers was 
Gilbert's real estate agent, not her property manager. 
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evidence and therefore cannot support a finding of the breach of the covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing. First, CLC's insinuations are purely speculative in nature, and second, and most 
importantly, while CLC may have argued as much to the district court, the district court never 
found as much in its decision. See R. 955-66 (noting the lack of any finding that JTS 
equivocated or was playing games regarding its position that it had exercised the six-month 
extension under the Third Amendment). Indeed, the district court expressly found a lack of 
malice or wantonness on behalf of JTS when it denied CLC's request for treble damages. 
R. 965. 
Accordingly, for the reasons stated in its Appellant's Brief, JTS maintains that the district 
court's findings of breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing were not supported by the 
evidence and should be reversed. See Appellant's Br. 27-29. 
D. Remaining Issues Related to Breach of the Lease and Damages, JTS's Counterclaims, 
and JTS's Combined Motion for Reconsideration. 
The remaining issues raised by CLC in its Respondent's Brief related to breach of the 
Lease and damages, JTS' s Counterclaims, and JTS' s Combined Motion for Reconsideration are 
amply addressed in JTS' s Appellant's Brief and JTS will not needlessly restate its position on the 
same, but is content to rest on its briefing in its opening brief. See Appellant's Br. 30-35. 
E. Attorney Fees in the District Court. 
JTS reiterates its arguments made in its Appellant's Brief regarding the impropriety of 
the district court's award of attorney fees. See Appellant's Br. 35-40. JTS makes only two brief, 
additional observations. First, JTS notes that CLC attempts to proffer Idaho Code Section 12-
120 (3) as a basis for supporting the district court's award of attorney fees. Resp't Br. 48. The 
Court may disregard this argument, as CLC never asked the district court to award fees 
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under Idaho Code Section 12-120(3) and the district court did not, in fact, grant any fees 
under Idaho Code Section 12-120(3). See State v. Haynes, 159 Idaho 36, 41, 355 P.3d 1266, 
12 71 (2015) ("It is well settled that an issue not raised before the trial court cannot be raised for 
the first time on appeal."). 
Second, CLC argues that it is entitled to attorney fees under the Lease because the Lease 
terms, including the attorney fee provisions, carried over into the holdover tenancy. Resp't Br. 
48-49. While JTS does not dispute that the provisions of the Lease carried over into the tenancy 
at-will that the district court found arose after October 2014, those provisions did not carry over 
once CLC, via Gilbert, elected to terminate JTS 's tenancy via the Eviction Letter. Thus, 
because CLC elected to terminate JTS's tenancy, it cannot now assert the attorney fee clause in 
the Lease. See Ellis v. Butterfield, 98 Idaho 644, 650, 570 P.2d 1334, 1340 (1977) ("[H]aving 
terminated the contract, they cannot later assert the attorney fee clause in it[.]" (emphasis 
added)). CLC's reliance on Garner v. Bartchi, 139 Idaho 430, 80 P.3d 1031 (2003), is misplaced 
in this regard because Garner dealt with an unenforceable or invalid contract-not a contract that 
was expressly terminated by the party now trying to claim attorney fees under the contract it 
terminated. 
F. Attorney Fees on Appeal. 
JTS maintains its request for fees on appeal under Idaho Code Section 6-324 and the 
Lease (see R. 37 "Enforcement Expenses") as argued in its Appellant's Brief. See Appellant's 
Br. 40. CLC argues that it is inconsistent for JTS to argue for fees under the Lease on appeal but 
then argue that CLC is not entitled to fees under the Lease because the Lease was no longer 
enforceable. Resp't Br. 49. There is nothing inconsistent about this position, of course JTS 
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seeks attorney fees under the Lease, it is JTS' s position that the Lease was still in force at the 
time of the wrongful eviction. If JTS prevails, the Lease would have still been in effect and 
JTS' s eviction would have been a breach of the Lease. Conversely, CLC insisted that the Lease 
be, and was, terminated on January 31, 2015. Having insisted as much, it cannot claim that the 
Lease was still in effect to claim the benefit of the attorney fees provision. 
Further, because JTS should prevail on appeal, CLC is not entitled to fees on appeal. 
Even in the event CLC prevails on appeal, for the same reasons CLC' s fees should have been 
limited in the district court, see Appellant's Br. 35-40, CLC's attorney fees on appeal should be 
limited to those expressly related to its unlawful detainer claim. 
III. CONCLUSION 
CLC elected to bring an unlawful detainer claim nine days before the notice required 
under the unlawful detainer statutes had run. It made the same election when it amended its 
complaint more than a month after JTS vacated the premises and possession was no longer at 
issue. Having elected to proceed under the unlawful detainer statutes rather than solely under the 
parties' contract, the only matter properly before the district court was the question of unlawful 
detainer and all other matters, including CLC' s breach of contract claims and any damages 
related to the same, should be struck. Further, under the plain language of the Third 
Amendment, JTS was not required to exercise the Option to Extend in writing. The district court 
erred in concluding otherwise. Because JTS properly extended the Lease for an additional six 




At a minimum, it is clear that JTS did not breach the Lease when it removed the 
transformer in accordance with the provisions of the Lease and the Eviction Letter drafted and 
sent at CLC's bequest. 
Accordingly, for the reasons stated in this brief and in JTS's Appellant's Brief, JTS 
respectfully requests that the Court reverse the decision of the district court and grant JTS its 
attorney fees and costs on appeal. 
DATED: March l~o19. 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP 
( 
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